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ABSTRACT: This paper discusses Toulmin’s (1964) concept of backing with respect to the emotional mode of 
arguing. Specifically, I examine an example from Fogelin (1985) where emotional backing justifies a warrant 
concerning when we should judge that a person is being pig-headed. While his treatment of this kind of argument 
can be supported by contemporary emotion science, it needs to be supplemented by therapeutic techniques whether 
or not our goal is to rationally resolve such arguments. This is shown through a comparison with an analysis of an 
emotional argument from Gilbert (1997). The introduction of psychotherapy into argumentation theory raises the 
question of the extent to which ordinary arguers can use such techniques. This is an issue I have explored before 
(Friemann, 2002) in terms of intractable quarrels. Seeing how psychotherapeutic techniques can be used in an 
intractable quarrel, I ask whether or not this is fruitful in the context of Fogelin’s idea of a deep disagreement.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Fogelin’s (1985, p. 5) Wittgensteinian claim in ‘The Logic of Deep Disagreements,’ is that deep 
disagreements cannot be rationally resolved because the conditions for argument do not exist. To 
explain this he first describes a disagreement that is not deep because the essential condition for 
argument is met: there is a shared background of beliefs and preferences (Ibid.). His suburban 
vignette is quoted in full. 
 
A is asked why he is taking a particular road and he responds, ‘I want to pick up the fish last.’ We can 
imagine this being a conclusive reply. On the other hand, it might be met with the rejoinder, ‘No, go to the 
Grand Union last; I don’t want the ice cream to melt.’ This too might be conclusive. But things could also 
become complicated. A might point out that the traffic that way is horrible this time of day, and it would be 
better to wait a bit to let it clear out. And he might be crushed by the reply ‘Today is Saturday.’ People 
being what they are, we can even imagine this discussion becoming quite heated. (Ibid., p. 3)  
 
Now while Fogelin does not come out and say that A is being pig-headed, we can easily 
understand the example to fit his analysis of a charge of pig-headedness six paragraphs later.  
 
Suppose, for example, that I accuse someone of being pig-headed. This is not a generous thing to say, but it 
is not a free floating insult either. To call someone pig-headed is to make quite a specific charge: he 
continues to cling to a position despite the fact that compelling reasons have been brought against it. But 
compelling to whom? We are saying that they ought to be compelling for him, or else it wouldn’t be right 
to call him pig-headed. He knows that they are true and in other, less interested, contexts would recognize 
their force. (Emphasis in original) (Ibid., p. 4) 
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So, if the disagreement about fish and ice cream is revised in order to reveal pig-headed 
behaviour, we end up with a picture of the emotions involved. (Since Fogelin identifies A as 
male, and the setting to be a suburban one, I will let Alex stand for A, and assume he is driving 
with his partner B.) B asks Alex why he is taking a certain road and he says, ‘I want to pick up 
the fish last.’ His partner tells him to take another road because she does not want melted ice 
cream. Alex disagrees, citing horrible traffic as his reason. B responds by saying it is Saturday, 
and Alex is crushed. It is reasonable to think that the idea of being crushed in this context refers 
to the feeling of shame. If Alex is feeling shame then he was invested in the argument. Next, 
Alex angrily denies that B is right while B accuses him of being pig-headed.  
 This argument is in a normal argumentative context because B makes an appeal to 
common ground (Ibid., p. 4). So B knows, and knows that Alex knows, that if it were not for his 
anger at being embarrassed, he would agree with her about which road to take, since they share 
views on weekend traffic patterns. Thus the form of B’s argument is this: ‘Alex, you are being 
pig-headed (claim), since by your own beliefs you should accept what I am saying about which 
road to take (data).’ The warrant for this argument is: people who resist an argument that should 
persuade them because it accords with their own beliefs, are being pig-headed. The backing for 
this warrant concerns the field of logic, because the concept of inconsistency is a factor, and the 
various sources of information from which we compile our understanding of emotion. (C.f. 
Gilbert, 1997, p. 90-91 for a brief outline of the latter). In commonsense terms we can 
understand what it means for someone to feel shame and then get angry; and depending on our 
goals, our analysis of this argument with respect to backing might stop at the mention of these 
fields. However, Fogelin’s main claim is that an argument such as this between Alex and his 
partner can be resolved because there is common ground. Before we pass over to deep 
disagreements, we should see what is involved in resolving arguments in normal argumentative 
contexts. If resolution is our goal, then which backing is chosen becomes quite important, for 
there are competing theories of emotion and some may be more adequate than others. Also, the 
way a particular emotion theory is used becomes important as well, for an adequate theory may 
be used for purposes for which it is unsuited. Since Fogelin’s example of fish and ice cream is an 
emotional argument, I will only concern myself with emotional backing and ignore the logical 
backing.  
 
EMOTION SCIENCE 
 
This is not the place for a full dress treatment of emotion theory, but two main ideas are relevant: 
1) feeling is not really distinct from thinking, 2) there is an important distinction between 
primary and secondary emotions. Although the scope of the first claim is wide, we will discuss it 
when we examine deep disagreements. Thus I turn my attention to the second claim, which can 
be the basis for our commonsense understanding of how Alex first feels shame and then anger. 
Damasio’s (1994; 1999) attempt to explain emotion is one of the most significant and popular. 
Within the category of emotion he distinguishes between primary or universal emotions like 
happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust, with secondary or social emotions like 
jealousy, embarrassment, guilt, and pride. Although emotions are evolutionarily more advanced 
than instincts and reflexes, the way primary emotions are described may lead one to think they 
have much in common with them. Primary emotions are hardwired: once we are aware of a 
certain type of stimulus our bodies automatically react in a pre-organized fashion. However, 
because of their automatic nature, false positives are a possibility, our bodies can react with fear 
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in situations where the stimulus turns out not to have been a fearful one; yet our bodies react 
fearfully anyway.  
Evolutionarily speaking, we can imagine a progression from simple nonconscious 
organisms that can only rely on a repertoire of reflexes and instincts, to higher nonconscious 
organisms that react through their primary emotions, yet they are not aware of them. But once 
organisms begin to perceive their primary emotions, then it is possible for the organisms to make 
systematic connections between a certain stimulus and its bodily reactions. It does not seem 
possible for organisms to make this connection without feeling their primary emotions, for 
without the consciousness of bodily changes the organism is simply reacting. The benefit of 
making systematic connections is that now the organism can anticipate the stimulus in its mind, 
and feel the way that stimulus organizes its body without having to be in the presence of the 
actual stimulus. And anticipation has obvious survival value. For humans, when we consciously 
think about something our bodies will react in particular ways; and how it reacts is to a 
significant degree a learned process. Damasio calls these acquired reactions secondary emotions. 
Now the preceding alone does not get us to our commonsense understanding of Alex’s 
pig-headed behaviour, for anger is identified by Damasio as a primary emotion, and shame as a 
secondary one. Thus we might think that the order in which the emotions are felt should be 
reversed: first anger is felt and then Alex’s acquired reaction to it is shame. Now while this order 
is certainly possible, for we can feel shame for getting angry, we should not think that emotion 
science suggests so rigid and simple a model. The account is much more complex, and it would 
be beyond the scope of this paper to delve into that account. However, fortunately we can show a 
little more fully the relevance of the distinction between primary and secondary emotions for our 
commonsense view if we look to how psychotherapy and psychology has used emotion science.  
 In a previous paper (Friemann, 2001) I suggested that it would be fruitful for argument 
theorists interested in reducing conflict to draw from Leslie Greenberg’s (1988; 1993; 2002) 
Emotionally Focused Therapy (EFT). The core idea we can take from EFT is its use of the 
distinction between primary and secondary emotions. Actually, Greenberg and Johnson (1986) 
explain why it is important to differentiate between three classes of client emotion in therapy. 
Along with the primary emotions, which are seen as conveying ‘biologically adaptive 
information that aids in problem solving and constructive relationship definition’ (Ibid., p. 5), 
there are secondary, and instrumental emotions. Instrumental emotions are easiest to explain: 
these are emotions that a person adopts like a role to achieve some effect. Greenberg and 
Johnson (Ibid.) give the example of someone expressing helplessness in order to gain sympathy. 
Since the person is aware of what he or she is doing, such emotions are ‘relatively easy to 
interrupt or divert people away from’ (Ibid.). Secondary emotions are often the ones that provide 
the motivation for therapy. Greenberg and Johnson give the example of anger at one’s spouse. 
This type of anger is obviously conscious, and if it is a defensive coping strategy, it is a 
secondary emotion. These emotions should not be heightened, they should be bypassed because 
to explore them could be detrimental to therapy. The key to the usefulness of EFT in terms of our 
commonsense understanding of Alex’s emotions is that any emotion can be primary, secondary, 
or instrumental. ‘It is not the emotion itself that can be categorized as primary, secondary, or 
instrumental: All emotions, basic or complex, can be primary, secondary, or instrumental’ 
(Greenberg, 2002, p. 46). What puts an emotion into a specific category has to do with what 
emotion is experienced first.  
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These primary feelings tell people who they really are and what they are most fundamentally feeling in any 
given moment. These can be basic emotions, such as anger or fear, or they can be complex emotions, such 
as jealousy or appreciation, as long as they are the person’s first response. (Ibid., p. 44) 
 
Given this understanding of the difference between primary and secondary emotions, we can say 
that Alex saw he was losing the argument and shame was his primary response; this was quickly 
covered up by a secondary response of anger. Greenberg’s interest in the surface/ depth dynamic 
here lies in the fact that people often do not notice their primary emotional response to situations. 
If Fogelin intends his example to be a case of pig-headedness - and I think he does - emotion 
science provides the background understanding of how this situation can arise. And if Fogelin is 
interested in rationally resolving the kind of emotional argument that I have supposed Alex finds 
himself in, then he should follow this line of thought and pay attention to the primary emotion. 
 
LIISA AND CYNTHIA  
 
On the other hand emotional arguments of the type we are considering, i.e. where someone does 
not accept an argument, and the person who offered the argument thinks he should on the basis 
of his own beliefs, may not be genuine cases of pig-headedness. And the interesting thing is that 
we may miss this fact unless we are paying attention to emotion. Thus even if we are not 
interested in resolving an emotional argument like the one between Alex and his partner, we still 
need to use the therapeutic techniques that should be employed if we wanted to resolve it. This is 
because by using such techniques we can find out whether or not the emotional argument is 
really a case of a person being pig-headed. This can be seen through an example from Gilbert. In 
‘What's In a Name’ (Gilbert, 1997, pp. 126-127) Liisa and Cynthia are arguing about changing 
the name of a club newsletter. Their entire exchange along with Gilbert’s comments in italics are 
reproduced here. 
 
1.Cynthia: Liisa, why do you think changing the name from The Weaver’s Club Newsletter to Woven 
Words Magazine is a bad idea? 
Cynthia begins by trying to determine Liisa’s position and goals. 
2.Liisa: Because the old name has a certain tradition. There are connections to it, and I don’t like throwing 
out the old for no good reason. 
3.Cynthia: I can sympathize with that, but we are a new club, aren’t we? 
4.Liisa: Yes, but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t keep some connection to the past. 
Liisa is sticking to her position and her motive. 
5.Cynthia: But since the name of the club is totally different, shouldn’t the magazine reflect that? I mean 
we aren’t called The Weaver’s Club anymore, so maybe the old name on the magazine should change? 
6.Liisa: [with some heat]: And why call it a magazine? What’s wrong with ‘newsletter’? Why change 
everything? 
Cynthia is nonplussed by this turn. Liisa seems to be overreacting, which may mean that there is something 
going on at a deeper level or in a different mode. 
7.Cynthia: Why does calling it a magazine change anything? It just sounds classier, don’t you think? 
More information about Liisa’s position is needed. 
8.Liisa: It sounds harder, that’s what. I edited a newsletter for two years, and now everyone wants me to 
edit a magazine! That’s a lot bigger job. 
Now Cynthia begins to see Liisa’s problem. The name change represents more to Liisa than just a new title. 
9.Cynthia: I see. So calling it a magazine makes it feel like a lot more responsibility? 
10.Liisa: Magazines are big and glossy. I can’t do something like that. What do I know about it? 
Now, having gotten further down into what is at the root of Liisa’s position, they might be able to find some 
way through the argument. 
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Now clearly this argument has to be modified if it is going to parallel the argument between 
Alex and his partner. Cynthia’s sense that there is inconsistency between Liisa’s beliefs has to 
be increased, so that it is clear to Cynthia that Liisa should agree with her if it were not for her 
emotion getting in the way. So we can imagine that Cynthia judges Liisa to be inconsistent on 
the basis of what she has already heard Liisa say about this issue. Suppose Liisa had said to 
others that the change to ‘Woven Words’ was acceptable to her, thinking that the ‘Newsletter’ 
part would be kept. And we must further suppose that the reason Liisa gives for her assent has 
something to do with the fact that a change in the club should be reflected in the name. And so 
Cynthia’s questions in turn (1), (3) and (5) reflects her belief that Liisa is being inconsistent. 
But of course, Liisa cannot in fact really be inconsistent (and be aware of this), if Cynthia’s 
judgment that she is being pig-headed is false. To this is may be objected that if the source of 
error is a false belief of Cynthia’s, then it is to the beliefs that we should turn and not the 
emotion. After all, if Cynthia believes something false about Liisa, we should expect this to 
come up in the discussion, especially since Cynthia is likely to press hard on the perceived 
inconsistency. At some point Liisa should say that she does not believe what Cynthia thinks she 
believes.  
In response to this it can be said that it is just a fact that some arguments are more 
complex than others. In the argument over fish and ice cream we can easily determine that Alex 
is being pig-headed, partly because the beliefs that are involved are fairly simple ones. That is, 
Alex’s partner can be pretty certain that he does not like bad fish, since if he did, she would 
have found out about it before. The more complex the emotional argument, the easier it is to 
miss the fact that the basis of someone’s opposition to you is a false belief. The following quote 
from Greenberg et al. addresses this point. 
 
Emotion clearly affects cognition and does so in a complex and differentiated fashion that researchers have 
only recently begun to investigate. It is clear however that once an emotional state has been elicited - by 
whatever means chemical, physiological, or cognitive - the person’s subsequent cognition is immediately 
affected. First, the organism’s current goal is altered in response to the newly emerging affective state. 
Second, the person’s train of thought is altered in a manner related to the ongoing affective state. 
(Greenberg, Rice, and Elliott, 1993, p. 52) 
 
Before Cynthia confronts Liisa, Liisa must have found out that the intention was to change not 
just the first part of the name, but also change ‘Newsletter’ to ‘Magazine.’ In order for Cynthia to 
confront her about this, Liisa must have made her opposition known somehow. Thus in turn (1) 
Liisa’s goal is to offer a response to Cynthia and hope she would not be pressed about it. That is, 
she does not want her real feelings known. Taking the Greenberg et al. quote to heart, Liisa’s 
goal will change at turn (6). And it does; after hearing the dreaded word ‘magazine’ twice in 
Cynthia’s turn (5), she now shows a willingness to uncover the real issue. The information she 
gives to Cynthia in turns (8) and (10) reveal that she is no longer having the same conversation 
as she was before turn (6). In (8) and (10) Liisa is not giving reasons for why the name of the 
club’s organ should stay the same; she is expressing her fear that she did not have the ability to 
handle the job. Turn (6) is important because the text indicates that Liisa speaks ‘with some 
heat.’ Now here is the point, if Cynthia were to focus on the beliefs of Liisa, then she would 
judge her behaviour as pig-headed. This is because she had just given a reason in turn (5) for 
why the name should be changed that she thinks accords with Liisa’s own beliefs. And now the 
only reason Liisa is holding out is because she feels her own inconsistency and subsequent 
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shame, which leads to anger. If Cynthia were to take this road she would likely have missed what 
Liisa’s emotion was telling her about her beliefs. 
Gilbert’s original example demonstrates the technique of position exploration, which 
takes interlocutors to be experts on their own experience. Cynthia takes her cues entirely from 
Liisa’s responses. A basic tenet of his coalescent argumentation (CA) is to be mindful of the 
signals interlocutors give when they are thinking about things in a different mode, or on a deeper 
level. Once a coalescent arguer notices that this is going on, he or she can incorporate a 
technique of Rogerian empathy like empathic responding into his or her responses. Such 
therapeutic techniques are not only useful when our focus is resolution, but as we have just seen, 
they are also useful in determining what is going on the first place.  
The fact that psychotherapeutic techniques may be necessary in order to understand an 
emotional argument, let alone resolve it, raises the issue of how ordinary arguers are going to be 
able to deal with this. (My use of the phrase ‘ordinary arguers’ is taken from van Eemeren and 
Meuffels, 2002, p. 45). It seems to me that the only thing we can do is to try to make accessible 
whatever techniques we pull from psychology and psychotherapy. I tried to do this in a previous 
paper (Friemann, 2002) for a specific type of emotional argument between couples that I called 
intractable quarrels (IQs). Relying on basic principles of systems therapy theory, I suggested that 
argument theorists should look to psychotherapy for insight. I am more sure of this than ever, for 
I now think Greenberg’s EFT can be integrated into an accessible set of ideas for argument 
scholars. However this is not what I wish to discuss. I will assume that it is legitimate to claim 
that psychotherapeutic techniques are relevant for emotional arguments, and move to the issue of 
Fogelin’s notion of a deep disagreement.  
 
DEEP DISAGREEMENT 
 
Now that we understand what Fogelin means by a disagreement caused by someone being pig-
headed, we can contrast it with a deep disagreement (DD). Alex was being pi-headed because he 
shared common ground with his partner, and his feeling of shame was quickly masked by anger, 
resulting in his rejection of his partner’s argument. In the language of emotion science, Alex’s 
secondary emotion covered up his primary emotional response. Now in a DD there is no 
common ground (Fogelin, Op. cit., p. 5). And, importantly, emotion does not get in the way. 
 
But we get a very different sort of disagreement when it proceeds from a clash in underlying principles. 
Under these circumstances, the parties may be unbiased, free of prejudice, consistent, coherent, precise and 
rigorous, yet still disagree. And disagree profoundly, not just marginally. (Ibid.) 
 
By my lights Fogelin is trying to eliminate the emotional aspects here, so the picture one gets is a 
disagreement between, say, two academics who have known for years that their positions on 
some issue is incompatible, and thus there is no point in arguing over it.  
 Now recall that at the beginning of section 3 on emotion science, I said that there are two 
main ideas from emotion theory that are relevant. I can now discuss the first one: feeling is not 
really distinct from thinking. 
Damasio’s denial of the traditional philosophical dichotomy between reason and emotion 
stems from his reconciliation between more traditional cognitive science perspectives, and a 
Jamesian view of emotion. Damasio (1994, p. 128) wants to challenge a seemingly sensible view 
with respect to evolutionary brain development and function: the notion that the evolutionarily 
older and lower brain regions are responsible for basic bodily regulations like emotions, and that 
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the newer and higher brain regions are responsible for reasoning and wisdom. The take away 
message from his first book, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (1994), 
was that this view is wrong: emotion is necessary in order for rationality to operate properly 
(Damasio, 1999, p. 42). He provides two stunning examples that lead to this conclusion: Phineas 
Gage (1994, pp. 3-33) and David (1999, pp. 43-47). Through Damasio’s explication of these 
examples, a powerful case emerges against the traditional philosophical (and general western 
intellectual) prescription against contaminating reason with emotion. 
Damasio challenges the Cartesian idea that reason and feeling are biologically distinct 
(Damasio, 1994, p. 168). He states that it is part of commonsense to believe that the following 
two situations involve thinking and deciding that are automatic and rapid, and hence have to do 
with the body: blood sugar drops and we decide to eat; some object falls and we move away to 
avoid getting hit (Ibid., pp. 166-167). He also thinks it is commonsense that the following third 
group of situations demand a kind of thinking and deciding that is fundamentally different from 
the kind needed for success in the first two situations: designing a building, solving a 
mathematical problem, composing a musical piece or writing a book (Ibid., p. 167). In order to 
deal with these situations we ‘…rely on the supposedly clear process of deriving logical 
consequences from assumed premises, the business of making reliable inferences which, 
unencumbered by passion, allows us to choose the best possible option, leading to the best 
possible outcome…’ (Ibid.). Yet, for all the differences between the first two and the third group 
of situations, Damasio (Ibid., p. 168) claims that ‘…there may well be a common thread running 
through all of them in the form of a shared neurobiological core.’ Damasio’s mention of this 
‘shared neurobiological core’ seems to suggest that thinking and feeling have at least some 
processes in common. If this is right then he is taking a position on one of the most important 
debates in emotion theory: whether or not emotion is a natural kind. However we do not need to 
go into that controversy to see that Damasio’s position allows us to say that at least theoretically, 
cognition should not be split off from emotion. Some researchers in cognitive science have taken 
the strong position that our theorizing about cognition should always be done with the body - and 
hence emotion – in mind (Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E., 1991). Thus according to 
the proponents of embodied cognition we are always emotional, even if commonsense would not 
judge us to be emotional.  
Yet we should not exaggerate. In a commonsense way it is perfectly acceptable to grant 
Fogelin the idea that DD’s can be devoid of emotion. At the same time however, it is not really 
emotion per se that is ruled out of a DD, just the emotions that arise through the dynamic of 
secondary emotions masking primary ones. For since the important point about a DD is the fact 
of no common ground, ideally there is no possibility of inconsistency. (I say ideally because as 
we say in my revision of the Liisa and Cynthia example, a false belief about someone can cause 
one to perceive inconsistency in a person where there is none). And if there is no inconsistency, 
there is no shame accompanying the feeling that one is losing the argument. Hence there is no 
anger caused by shame either. But this does not mean that the academics cannot get angry at 
each other; it just means that they will not do so for a particular reason.  
 Now it seems to me that Fogelin is taking an objective perspective from which to view a 
DD. And from this vantage point he is right: DD’s cannot be rationally resolved. Does this mean 
that psychotherapeutic techniques have no place in a DD, and that we can only rely on non-
rational persuasion? This would be the case if such techniques had their application only in 
resolution contexts. And we have seen that this is not the case. From a subjective perspective, 
how can we tell whether or not we are in a DD? If we modify Fogelin’s notion that a DD is 
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emotion free to bring more reality to it, then anger can occur, it will just have to be primary 
anger. Aristotle thought that anger is caused by our belief that we or our friends were treated 
unfairly. I assume that it is possible that one of our hypothetical academics could perceive the 
other as being unfair to him or her. Now, is it possible to think up a sufficiently complex 
example where primary anger expressed by one academic to the other, can get misconstrued by 
that other such that he believes that the first academic is getting angry and hence not accepting 
his claims, because she feels that she is losing the argument? I think so, for all we have to do is 
think about the situation where these academics are new colleagues as opposed to old ones. And 
if we give them positions on an issue that are in fact incompatible, we have a situation where if 
they interact at all, the second might well come to hold a false belief about the first. This false 
belief of course would be that the first academic is being pig-headed. If this is plausible then we 
have a parallel case for our modified example of Liisa and Cynthia. In that example emotion 
obscured the fact that there was common ground, and in this case of the DD, I am claiming that 
at least for a while, emotion can obscure the fact that there is no common ground. In the DD 
then, the second academic feels he is in an argument because he misconstrues primary emotion 
as secondary emotion. 
 Now I am not supposing that the main reason we should want to be able to recognize the 
expression of primary emotion is to find out whether or not we are in a DD. Fogelin does not 
claim DD’s are common. And it might not be thought worth the effort for such a meager payoff. 
However, knowing that one is in a DD through the ability to recognize primary emotional 
expression, only appears unimpressive because of the way Fogelin has conceptualized the DD. In 
less extreme contexts the ability to mark the difference between the two kinds of emotion can 
help very much in figuring out just what is really going on in an argument. And finally, the skill 
of differentiating between primary and secondary emotion is crucial to conflict resolution.  
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